The Enemies Without and Within Cancer and the History of the Laboratory Sciences by Kevles, Daniel J.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
The Enemies Without and Within 
Cancer and the History of the Laboratory Sciences 
Daniel J. Kevles 
HUMANITIES WORKING PAPER 154 
March 1993 

THE ENEMIES WITHOUT AND WITHIN 
CANCER AND THE HISTORY OF THE LABORATORY SCIENCES 
@Daniel J. Kevles, 1992* 
It is well known that national defense has long been a stimulant to research and 
development and that in most of the industrialized countries since World War II, it has 
acted as a mighty engine of innovation, fostering -- and profiting from -- an immense range 
of programs for scientific research and training. In the name of deterring enemies, the 
American government has sponsored investigations in fields ranging from nuclear physics 
and microelectronics on the one side to mathematical logic and various branches of 
psychology on the other. I would like to suggest that in the twentieth century defense 
against disease has played a similar energizing role in the laboratory sciences and that no 
disease has been more aptly analogous to national defense in its uses and generation of 
scientific research than that most dread enemy of health -- cancer. 
In the United States -- to which I will largely confine myself here -- the metaphor of 
battle has pervaded discourse on the drive to understand, ameliorate, and cure cancer 
since early in this century, not to mention in more recent years, when President Richard M. 
Nixon initiated a federal crash program -- the War on Cancer that began in 1971 -- to 
combat the disease. In the 1920s, cancer surpassed tuberculosis in the American 
mortality tables and became the second most prevalent cause of death, behind heart 
disease, where it remains today. Increasingly through these decades, cancer has loomed 
in public perception as the disease to be feared above all others if only because, like a 
terrorist, it tends to strike without reason or warning everywhere on the socioeconomic 
scale and because so many of its forms continue to defy cure. 
*Distinguished Lecture, History of Science Society, Washington, D.C., December 29, 
1992. 
1 
The century-long war has been carried out on many fronts -- in the clinic, the 
operating room, and the epidemiological field -- but also, with steadily mounting 
commitment and illumination, in the laboratory. This war may not yet have produced 
many therapeutic or curative victories, but it has been greatly affected by the experimental 
sciences and has had enormous effects upon them. Perhaps more than most modern 
stories of disease, it represents a rich interplay between, on the one side, human suffering, 
hope, and desperation and, on the other, the limits, exaggerated claims, and genuine 
prospects of scientific medicine. The development of cancer research is -- let us hope --
an unfinished story, yet I think that even now it offers itself as a useful organizing principle 
in the otherwise disparate field of the twentieth-century biomedical sciences. 
Recognized since ancient times, the disease derives its name from the Greek for 
"crab," karkinos, expressing the tendency of cancers to claw in multiple directions into 
normal tissue. Similarly, the study of it -- oncology -- derives from the Greek oncos, for 
"mass." Nineteenth-century histologists, armed with the achromatic microscope, were 
able to recognize cancers in various organs as compositions of disorganized, abnormal 
cells. Rudolph Virchow, who wrote an entire book about cancer, encouraged the idea that 
most tumors were proliferations of cells from existing organs -- that they were by and 
large organ specific. For centuries, physicians knew no treatment for cancer other than 
surgical removal of accessible organs; perhaps the most widely practiced was 
mastectomy, which before the days of antisepsis involved searing off the breast with a red 
hot knife. 
Galen, whose authority in the matter prevailed at least until 1500 A.D., attributed 
cancer to an excess of black bile, one of the four humors. Some of his successors at 
theorizing found the origins of cancer in -- variously -- immoral behavior, venery, 
depression, or (in the case of nuns) celibacy. Others, noting the tendency of some 
cancers to cluster in families, located the source in heredity. Here and there, from the late 
eighteenth century onward, several observers located the source in environmental 
poisons -- the soot in which chimney sweepers worked, the snuff and tobacco that 
gentlemen inhaled, the dust in mines, and the chemicals in aniline dyes. But at the end of 
the nineteenth century an honest reporter might have echoed what the leading Philadelphia 
surgeon SamueL Gr_oss had writtenjn the ~middle of .it: '~All we know, with any degree of 
certainty, [about cancer] is that we know nothing." 
* * * 
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However, from the late nineteenth century onward, the increasing spread of 
laboratory methods into the life sciences became not only a surgical but an experimental 
science -- and a well-supported one, too. Let me examine these developments by 
exploring, first, the period between the 1880s and the outbreak of World War II, and, 
then, the period since the Second World War. 
Even in the first period, endowments, hospitals, and institutes were established for 
clinical and experimental investigations into cancer. Subventions came from state 
legislatures and the rich, often benefactors who had lost loved ones to cancer and who 
settled individual sums -- for example, $1.5 million to Columbia University in 1910 and 
$10 million to Yale in 1936 -- on institutions for cancer research that physical scientists of 
the day could only dream about. To this period can be traced the origins of many of the 
major cancer research facilities in Europe as well as in the United States. Towards the end 
of this period, the crusade against cancer enlisted the federal government, with the 
creation, in 1937, of the National Cancer Institute (NCI), which was given enough money 
in its first year of operation virtually to double national expenditures on the disease. 
It is likely that the greater proportion of these resources was devoted to clinical 
rather than basic biological research, and a degree of faddishness marked the uptake by 
cancer researchers of new trends in the life sciences. Thus, in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the advent of infectious theories of disease stimulated a search 
in many laboratories for cancer-causing microorganisms, including protozoa, bacteria, 
spirochetes, and molds. This program failed and infectious theories of cancer were waning 
in scientific respectability when, in 1911, at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, 
the young biologist Peyton Rous demonstrated that a tumor could be induced in a healthy 
chicken with a non-filterable agent -- a virus -- obtained from a malignancy in a cancerous 
one. However, although Rous' discovery revived the infectious theory for a time, 
scientists of his day were unable to observe similar viral transmission of cancers in other 
animals, and so the theory fell into deep disrepute in most -- though not all -- circles of 
oncology. 
Cancer studies mirrored almost every new development in the experimental life 
sciences. In 1902, the German biologist Theodor Boveri attributed cancer to abnormal 
chromosomes, drawing _upon >his own, embryolo~gical observations of chromosomal oddities 
in sea urchins, which he extended to the study of mitoses in tumors. In the early 1920s, 
the biochemist Otto Warburg, in the course of his work on cellular metabolism, discovered 
that cancer cells underwent anaerobic glycolysis, and he proposed that a possible cause of 
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cancer was cellular anoxia. Other scientists attempted to marshall the new Mendelian 
genetics to obtain a purchase on the tendency of cancer to run in families. And in the 
1930s, developments in endocrinology stimulated not only theories but some laboratory 
demonstrations that sex hormones could induce mammary tumors in mice. 
The steady integration of chemistry and biology prompted searches for carcinogenic 
materials and for analyses of their carcinogenic specificity -- that is, chemical 
determinations of what it is in, for example, soot, that causes cancer. The specifications 
were assisted by the arsenal of tools that chemistry was acquiring from physics. In 1932, 
the use of fluorescent spectra enabled the identification of the organic compound in coal 
tar that is carcinogenic, an accomplishment that fostered numerous attempts -- most of 
them fruitless apparently -- to account for oncogenesis in terms of the chemical structure 
of carcinogens. In 1938, W.C. Hueper, a German immigrant chemist employed at DuPont 
and concerned with bladder cancer among aniline dye workers, was able to demonstrate 
that repeated subcutaneous injections of 2-napthylamines induced bladder cancer in dogs. 
According to Hue per, DuPont not only refused to permit him to publish his results but also 
fired him. 
By and large before World War II, each of the oncological indications from the 
experimental life sciences apparently failed to lead anywhere fast -- because it was 
ambiguous and uncertain; or because, like Rous's viral hypothesis, it sputtered as a 
research program; or because, like Hueper's observations, it threatened powerful economic 
interests. Many of these indications were celebrated in the press -- no doubt with the 
cooperation of scientists -- with the consequence that hopes were raised only to be 
dashed. It is understandable that a certain skepticism seems to have set in concerning the 
merits of the latest theory of cancer and promises for cures. 
Yet certain parts of the work, comprising something more than evanescent embrace 
of scientific fashion, left scientifically lasting legacies. Some of these legacies were in the 
materials and methods devised in the attempt to transform oncology itself into an 
experimental science. Thus, early in the century, tumors were transplanted into mice, 
establishing rodents as agents of controllable and reproducible oncogenic experiment. 
During the 1920s, particular mouse lines were bred to be highly susceptible to tumors, 
leading to sublines that are ubiquitous in the curcent wor:ld of research, and the Roscoe B. 
Jackson Memorial Laboratory in Bar Harbor, Maine --today the leading supplier of 
standardized mouse strains in the United States -- was founded in part to develop and 
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maintain lines of inbred mice for the purpose of establishing the genetics of cancer on a 
sound experimental basis. 
The drive to extend experimental cancer research also contributed to the invention 
of tissue-culture techniques that would become fundamental in many fields of 
experimental biology and that also permitted the study in vitro of the conversion of normal 
cells into cancerous ones. One of these cultures came to be known as HeLa -- because it 
was derived from an aggressive cancer of the cervix of a woman named Henrietta Lacks 
(or possibly Helen Lane or Helen Larson) -- and the line would come to perform myriad 
services through the world of experimental biology, outliving both the eponymous patient 
and her cytologist. 
Faddishness in the embrace of new developments in the laboratory sciences was 
particularly marked on the therapeutic side of cancer. Clinicians -- both caring and 
ambitious in varying proportions -- and desperate patients together formed a community of 
demand for cures. After Paul Ehrlich found his magic bullet of salvarsan, in 1906, he tried 
to find a magic bullet for cancer, too. Drug companies exploited brute-force experimental 
protocols to discover chemotherapeutic agents, injecting cancerous mice with a variety of 
compounds, some of which they advertised as products with "striking therapeutic 
effects." However, the most promising therapeutic dividends from the experimental 
sciences appeared to come from the new marvels that emerged from turn-of-the-century 
experimental physics -- radioactivity and X rays. 
Pierre Curie himself helped pioneer what came to be called "Curietherapy" --the 
use of radium to destroy tumors. Early clinical successes led to the establishment in 1909 
of the Radium Institute affiliated with the lnstitut Pasteur, where scientists and physicians 
might conduct studies on the physics, biology, and clinical uses of the element. The 
Radium Institute commanded ample monies, Madame Curie as the director of its physics 
branch, and the able physician Claudius Regaud as head of its biomedical counterpart 
across the garden. Radiophysics, radiobiology, and radiomedicine all flourished at the 
Institute, and millions of additional francs came to it -- some of them from the women of 
America, who raised $1 00,000 to buy Madame Curie a gram of radium on the occasion of 
her visit to the United States in 1921. She was toasted from Yale to the White House, 
where President Harding gave her the radium itself, before some six hundred senators and 
congressmen, diplomats and scientists, wives and leading women. 
X-ray therapy for cancer was tried within a few years after their discovery, in 
1895, but initial successes in burning out malignancies were soon overshadowed by the 
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tendency of the crude early technology to combine with ignorance of the dose response in 
living tissue to burn out the patient or, as was clear by 1914, iatrogenically to cause 
cancer. However, although enthusiasm for X-ray therapy declined as that for Curietherapy 
mounted, it began to revive around 1930 when more was known about the impact of 
high-energy radiation on living tissue and X-ray technologies were under development that 
promised to be more precisely controllable, targetable, and penetrating. 
That expectation brought cancer philanthropy within the reach of physicists who 
were developing more powerful tubes with which to accelerate atomic particles to explore 
the nucleus. Such support assisted the Caltech physicist C. C. Lauritsen in building a high-
power X-ray tube that might speed particles to one million volts of energy, and the 
Berkeley physicist David Sloan, one of Ernest 0. Lawrence's proteges, to develop an X-ray 
tube that supplied a beam as intense and energetic as half the world's purified radium. 
By then the biggest assault weapon against the nucleus was the cyclotron. 
Lawrence, bolstered by his brother John, a physician who came to guide radiobiological 
work in the laboratory, touted neutrons and radioisotopes, which cyclotrons could produce 
in abundance, as potentially more effective than X rays in treating human cancer. Like 
the Radium Institute in Paris, the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley embarked on 
radiobiological research -- though with less rigor -- first with mice and then, in 1938, with 
people, including one Robert Penney who was the first patient to be zapped with neutrons 
from the 60-inch accelerator. Private cancer money helped significantly to build the 60-
inch, and in the late 1930s Lawrence's laboratory received tens of thousands of dollars 
from the new National Cancer Institute. Lawrence himself sat with the Nobel Laureate 
physicist Arthur Holly Compton as a committee of two to decide how to spend up to 
$100,000 a year of NCI money on the improvement of cyclotrons operating in the United 
States. As John Heilbron and Robert Seidel have told us in their study of Lawrence and 
his laboratory, all but two of the cyclotrons commissioned in the United States after 1936 
were dedicated largely to biomedical work, meaning mainly cancer research. Yet virtually 
every physicist welcomed these machines primarily for the same reason that Ernest 
Lawrence had, privately, praised David Sloan's X-ray tube --that is, for its "terrific 
effectiveness" in producing intense beams of high-energy protons for bombarding nuclei. 
* * * 
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After World War II, it was widely proclaimed that America's foreign foes had been 
defeated in the laboratories and that in the peace science, sufficiently mobilized, could 
defeat her people's domestic enemies, including cancer. Stafford Warren, the medical 
research director of the Manhattan Project and a specialist in radiation, told Congress in 
1946 that dealing with "the cancer problem is no more impossible than the atomic bomb." 
Wartime technical developments paid dividends in peacetime therapies. Microwave 
technology contributed to the building of sleek, compact linear accelerators for 
radiotherapy. Nuclear reactors produced artificially radioactive elements in quantities far 
more abundant than those that cyclotrons could spew forth, and in 1949, the recently 
created Atomic Energy Commission announced that it was giving away $500,000 worth 
of radioactive chemicals for use in the war against cancer. Reader's Digest, pointing out 
that radioactive cobalt could be surgically implanted, extolled the element as "the poor 
man's radium" and the "greatest, most beneficial dividend from the A-bomb." Wartime 
research had also revealed that nitrogen mustards could destroy human lymphomas. That 
discovery led promptly to the development of the first generation of effective 
chemotherapeutics, including the folic acid antagonists that Sidney Farber used in 194 7 to 
achieve temporary remissions of acute leukemia in children. 
Amid the postwar propensity to enlarge federal investment in research, such 
successes helped stimulate enormous increases in the budget of the National Cancer 
Institute, which climbed from $18 million at the beginning of the Eisenhower years to 
$110 million by the end of them. Equally a stimulus was the American Cancer Society, 
which, beginning with its takeover by Mary Lasker and her friends in the mid-1940s, 
became an aggressive lobby for cancer appropriations and also a ferocious fund-raising 
force on its own. As in many other areas of the biomedical sciences, private philanthropy 
and fund-raising campaigns continued to play a significant role in providing resources for 
clinical and biological research into the disease. The American Cancer Society, which 
raised ever-more millions each year, soon began to spend a quarter of its budget on grants 
for research, and acknowledgments for its subventions can be found in many important 
biomedical research papers. Public and private support conjoined in many places to 
transform research hospitals and facilities into institutions that now tower on the 
biomedical landscape --for example~ the Fox,Chase Cancer, .Research Center, in 
Philadelphia; the Roswell Park Memorial Institute, in Buffalo, New York; the M.D. Anderson 
Hospital for Cancer Research at the University of Texas; and the Memorial-Sloan-Kettering 
Hospital, in New York City. 
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The war -- and the Cold War -- heightened awareness of environmental causes of 
cancer, starting with the fallout generated by atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and 
spreading to other types of environmental taxies. In 1948, the National Cancer Institute 
hired William Hueper as head of its new Environmental Cancer Section. Under Hueper's 
laboratory program, the NCI identified an increasing number of chemical compounds as 
carcinogenic for animals -- and, by extensions, for human beings. Hueper's publications 
strongly influenced Rachel Carson in writing Silent Spring, which no doubt did more than 
any other book to popularize what epidemiologists and laboratory scientists had together 
learned about carcinogenesis. What they had learned was that cancer is often the product 
of enemies without, of oncogenic emanations and materials -- some of them, like 
ultraviolet radiation, in the natural environment but an increasing number of them in the 
human-made one. Silent Spring accelerated epidemiological and laboratory inquiries that 
would expose the carcinogenic qualities of an expanding range of chemical compounds --
for example, DES, the hormonal supplement for women -- and confirm the powerful 
likelihood, manifestly evident in the early 1960s, that smoking could cause cancer. 
It seems that only a small fraction of the enormous resources that became available 
for cancer research in the quarter century after World War II were devoted to 
epidemiological studies of the disease. A considerable fraction of federal cancer research 
funds was given over to a cut-and-try search for chemotherapeutic compounds. The 
policy may well have pleased many industries; it displeased many scientists because in the 
then-current state of knowledge, the search was a hit-or-miss proposition, sufficiently 
Edisonian in character to provoke some critics to characterize the program as: "nothing to 
stupid to test." 
Still, much of the national cancer research program was absorbed with 
investigations into the internal biological processes that led to malignancies. To most of 
the program's leadership, what was necessary to untangle this defiant puzzle were studies 
into fields of biology that seemed plausibly relevant to cellular metabolism, growth, 
regulation, and multiplication. Thus, the national cancer program was a major patron of 
basic research in molecular genetics, endocrinology, immunology, and biochemistry, 
including the laboratory methods, materials, and instrumentations essential for work in 
those areas. 
By the early 1970s, it was also paying salient attention to the field pioneered by 
Peyton Rous -- tumor virology -- which field I will dwell on for the rest of this lecture 
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because its development sharply illustrates a number of the themes that I've been 
exploring and has proved to be dramatically important. 
How tumor virology recovered from the disrepute into which it had fallen by World 
War I is a remarkable and extensive story in and of itself. Suffice it to say here that, 
despite the general rejection of Rous' claim that a virus might induce cancer, the idea had 
remained alive in research programs here and there -- notably at the Rockefeller Institute 
for Medical Research and at the Jackson Laboratories, in Bar Harbor -- which had slowly 
accumulated more evidence of viral oncogenesis in animals such as rabbits and mice. 
Operating far outside the main stream of biomedical research was the one-man program of 
an immigrant physician named Ludwik Gross. In 1950, while a staff member at a 
veteran's hospital laboratory in New York, Gross showed that he could induce leukemia 
with viruses in a particular inbred strain of newborn mice. Gross' work -- ignored until 
after it was confirmed five years later by an established biomedical researcher -- led in the 
later 1 950s to the discovery of a number of animal tumor viruses and to an increasingly 
broad-based revival of the theory of viral oncogenesis. 
And not only of theory but, in the 1950s and 1960s, to enormously productive 
laboratory studies in the subject. The progress profited significantly from the introduction 
of the techniques of phage genetics -- the quantitative analyses of plaques on uniform 
single layers of cells in culture -- into animal virology and their exploitation by Renato 
Dulbecco, working with the polyoma virus, to transform cells in vitro, that is, to provoke 
them to divide without restraint. At Caltech, Howard Temin and Harry Rubin, two 
proteges of Dulbecco, achieved the transformation of cells using similar techniques with 
what was coming to be called the Rous sarcoma virus. The phenomenon of 
transformation could be observed and quantified because it signaled its presence by the 
appearance of so-called foci on the flat face of the cell culture. 
Beginning with the late Fifties, animal tumor virology of course benefitted also from 
the new knowledge that viruses consist of a protein coat wrapped around a core of nucleic 
acid -- either deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA). Dulbecco argued that 
cells are transformed when viral DNA is integrated into native cellular DNA, a contention 
that he proved experimentally in the 1960s. Or proved it at least for viruses like polyoma, 
which have DNA at their core. The issue of cellular.~traosformation appeared to be rather 
more complicated in the case of the Rous sarcoma virus, whose core comprises RNA. 
DNA could code for RNA, but, as many of you know, the reverse was held to be 
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impossible -- which implied that RNA could neither integrate into cellular DNA nor could it 
generate any DNA to be integrated either. 
However, Howard Temin insisted that viral RNA could generate double-stranded 
DNA complementary to it and thus act, as he wrote in 1964, "as a carcinogenic agent by 
adding some new genetic information to the cell." Temin, although ridiculed as 
scientifically wrongheaded, tenaciously accumulated experimental evidence in favor of his 
hypothesis as a young faculty member working in the McCardle Institute for Cancer 
Research, at the University of Wisconsin. Cancer research repaid the experimental life 
sciences when, in 1970, Temin decisively proved his hypothesis by reporting --
simultaneously with David Baltimore, another protege of Dulbecco's, then at MIT-- the 
discovery of the enzyme, soon dubbed reverse transcriptase, that catalyzed the synthesis 
of DNA from RNA. 
By now research on animal tumor viruses had come to form a major branch of basic 
medical and biological science, spotlighting the achievement of Peyton Rous, who, in 
1966, at age eighty-five, shared the Nobel prize in physiology or medicine for the work he 
had done 55 years earlier. After the dramatic achievements of Dulbecco, Temin, and 
Baltimore, it was tempting to leap from the demonstration that viruses were responsible 
for animal tumors to the belief that they must be the cause of human malignancies, too. A 
number of influential scientists enthusiastically took the leap -- for example, the chief of 
the laboratory of infectious diseases at the National Institutes of Health, who declared: 
"There isn't the slightest doubt in our minds that human cancers are caused by viruses." 
It was that type of super scientific confidence that meshed with the political 
calculations of President Nixon to inaugurate the War on Cancer, which drove federal 
expenditure in the war against the "Big C," as John Wayne called it, to about one billion 
dollars a year by 1980. Yet the confidence was by no means universal among scientists, 
partly because the role of viruses in human -- as distinct from animal -- cancers was very 
unclear and partly because the basic mechanisms of cellular transformation were 
unknown. James D. Watson spoke for many scientific dissenters when he exclaimed that 
the proponents of the War had sold the American public a "nasty bill of goods about 
cancer," adding, with greater pungency than most of his colleagues might have publicly 
employed, that the. whole enterprise was, as he puLit, ·~.a bunch of shit." 
Although the full scientific impact of the War on Cancer awaits its historian, the 
main outlines of its consequences seem clear enough. Endless patrols were organized to 
search for viral agents of natural cancers. Few were flushed out for animal cancers and 
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none was found for the human variety. Neither did the war produce any dramatic new 
cures for cancer, a failure that drew denunciations of the campaign as a "medical 
Vietnam." However, the War on Cancer was not without its successes because it 
supplied the means to many investigators to pursue basic laboratory research in animal 
virology that they might have otherwise been unable to do -- and at least one of those 
projects led to profoundly striking and unexpected results. 
The project was guided by two young biomedical scientists at the University of 
California, San Francisco, Medical School named Michael Bishop and Harold Varmus. In 
the early 1970s, they set out to test a hypothesis, recently advanced, that the cells of 
many, if not all vertebrates, must naturally contain carcinogenic stretches of DNA, 
stretches that had been named "oncogenes." The argument ran that oncogenes have the 
power to transform normal cells into tumor cells but that they are normally repressed --
meaning that they lie latent until they are activated by either natural or environmental 
causes. Bishop and Varmus focused specifically on a fragment of Rous sarcoma RNA that 
had recently been identified as the fragment in the virus that, when operated on by reverse 
transcriptase, became the DNA that turned normal chicken cells into sarcoma cells. 
Scientists referred to this viral DNA as the "sarc" oncogene. For Bishop and Varmus, the 
question was whether the viral sarc oncogene had a homologous counterpart in normal 
chicken-cell DNA. 
By 1976, they had obtained results that surprised and exhilarated them: 
Homologues of the sarc gene appeared to be contained in the DNA not only of chickens 
but also of quail, turkeys, ducks, and even emus, one of the most primitive birds. No 
question about it: variations of sarc DNA did reside in the cellular DNA of many avian 
species. In 1978, Bishop and Varmus reported that they had also found closely related 
versions of the gene in the DNA of calves, mice, and salmon. They even had detected 
evidence of it in human DNA. Close relatives of the sarc gene --that seed of cancer--
seemed to be everywhere. 
Its virtual ubiquity led Bishop and Varmus to think about it in evolutionary terms. 
According to the fossil record, the major groups of species -- birds, mammals, and fish --
that embodied the gene had separated at least 400 million years earlier. To Bishop and 
Varmus, the plain evjdence lhat the basic,sarc--gene .had been .conserved through so much 
time and speciation indicated that it might be involved in some critical cellular function --
the generation of structure, perhaps, or gene regulation. Indeed, tests showed that it was 
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active in normal cells, undergoing transcription into messenger RNA and translation into a 
protein. 
Bishop and Varmus' results rapidly made oncogenes a major branch of basic 
biomedical research. The work was powerfully equipped by an arsenal of new 
experimental tools -- for example, recombinant DNA, gene sequencing, Southern blotting --
that had become available in molecular biology during the 1970s and that together 
permitted the rapid isolation, identification, and experimental manipulation of single genes. 
By the early 1980s, it was evident that a variety of oncogenes are to be found in different 
types of animal cancer cells, that many of these oncogenes are non-viral or the same as 
those found in viruses, and that -- most important -- many animal oncogenes are also 
human oncogenes 
It was also evident that the oncogenes now demonstrated to reside in the normal 
cell are not quite the oncogenes -- the repressed tumor-causing DNA -- advanced in the 
original oncogene hypothesis. They are normal cellular genes. Most such genes seem to 
exist all over the tree of animal evolution, reinforcing Bishop and Varmus' idea that they 
must be involved in fundamental cellular processes, probably growth and differentiation. 
Almost all of them seem to express themselves -- that is, generate proteins -- during 
normal cellular development. Since they perform normal functions, cellular oncogenes are 
thus, strictly speaking, not oncogenes. They thus came to be termed "proto-oncogenes." 
They were recognized as normal genes that can somehow be turned into the agents of 
cancer -- friends of the body that can turn into foes. As such, Michael Bishop said, they 
are a kind of "enemy within." 
H. G. Wells had declared in 1927: "The disease of cancer will be banished from life 
by calm, unhurrying, persistent men and women, working with every shiver of feeling 
controlled and suppressed, in hospitals and laboratories, and the motive that will conquer 
cancer will not be pity nor horror; it will be curiosity to know how and why." Wells' 
declaration is true in a number of respects; neither Dulbecco, Bishop, nor Varmus set out 
to discover the secret of cancer. However, others, like Temin, have been quite 
oncologically oriented. And it must be remembered that the martial metaphor has 
contributed enormously to establishing the opportunities of biomedical scientists, whatever 
their orientation, to satisty their curiosity. 
Like the scientific promises invoked for national defense, the claims made for 
cancer research over the decades have often been marked by exaggerated optimism, self-
interested salesmanship, and grossly overstated estimates of the degree of threat from the 
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enemy. Clinical as well as laboratory oncology have both exploited the specter, and so 
has the environmental branch of the field -- for example, in the 1970s promulgating vastly 
overblown -- because they were vastly simplistic -- estimates of cancer deaths that would 
arise from carcinogens in the workplace and elsewhere in the environment. It is probably 
the case that in American democratic culture at least, it is impossible to mobilize resources 
for sustained explorations into the fundamental processes of nature and disease without 
the exaggerations of politics and public-relations promises of miracles around the corner. 
It is also the case that such campaigns, when guided by competent scientific authority, 
have yielded considerable scientific and technological dividends. 
Indeed, like national defense, not only the war against cancer with a capital W but 
the long lower-case war against cancer has, especially in recent years, led through the 
experimental laboratory to remarkable scientific achievements. The theory of oncogenes 
that has come to prevail has opened the door to a biological union among the various 
stimuli to cancer -- radiations, chemicals, hormones, viruses, genes -- that the laboratory 
and epidemiological sciences have exposed since the turn of the century. All, it seems, 
were simply parts of the same elephant. The theory reveals that the enemies without are 
allied with enemies within. Indeed, their alliance has been demonstrated empirically -- by 
laboratory experiments that environmental carcinogens will turn normal cellular DNA into 
abnormal, oncogenic DNA. 
Equally important, the advent of oncogenes has opened a new era in normal cellular 
biology. Since oncogenes are normal genes gone wrong, then identifying oncogenes is a 
powerful method of picking out and then analyzing the cellular role of genes that are 
involved in normal growth, regulation, and differentiation. Here again cancer research has 
repaid what it has borrowed from the laboratory sciences -- and repaid the debt 
handsomely. As Michael Bishop wrote in the spring of 1983, by studying the behavior of 
these genes, "we seek to solve not only the riddle of the cancer cell, but also the riddles of 
normal growth and development," adding, "The human intellect has finally laid hold of 
cancer with a grip that may eventually extract the deadly secrets of the disease." 
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